Nixon in China: 50 Years On
In February 1972, President Richard Nixon flew into Beijing to normalise ties with the PRC. This momentous occasion had great promise, but lot has changed since.
The time was just before 11:30 am on a cold February 21st. Zhou Enlai - the Premier, second only to Mao - stood with a small crowd and a troop of PLA soldiers. At the time, China was in the midst of the Cultural Revolution which would permanently scar the country and its people. No one was safe from the violence of Mao’s Red Guards who could target anyone deemed to not be of pure revolutionary fervour - it was easy to be classified as the catch all Capitalist Roader! Not even those at the very top of the nation were safe. Deng Xiaoping - the man who’d eventually rule China - was exiled to the bitter north to work in a tractor factory and his son was permanently paralysed after a Red Guard mob repeatedly threw him out of a window atop a building staircase. At the airport however, all was calm and subdued as the entourage awaited their guest.
The tranquillity of the morning broke when the Presidential Boeing 707 landed at Capital Airport near Beijing with it’s four screeching turbojet engines. President Nixon and his delegation descended the steps and met with Premier Zhou. Accompanying White House staff were surprised by the small size of the gathering considering what it was for. President Nixon and Premier Zhou inspected the PLA troops and listened to the national anthems of each country before being guided into a vehicle to be driven into Beijing itself. 1
First Contact
Nixon’s visit didn’t just happen on a whim. A great deal of ground work and diplomacy was required prior to the visit to set the stage. Nor was the visit just on the back of good will towards Mao and the PRC. The United States was embroiled in a war of attrition in Vietnam trying to prevent the communist north taking over the south. The war had become increasingly unpopular among Americans who saw their ‘boys’ being killed or injured for a conflict that show no signs of progress for a country they frankly cared little about. Republican Party candidate Richard Nixon ran on a platform of getting out of Vietnam and putting end to the calamity that the conflict had become - that position helped secure his election to the White House.
The China that Nixon set foot in had since 1949 shut itself away behind a ‘Bamboo Curtain’2 with the Communist takeover under Chairman Mao Zedong. Beijing’s relationship with it’s Soviet neighbour - the other great landmass under communism - although rosy when Stalin occupied the Kremlin, and since dramatically soured, even leading to a months long border skirmish between the two. So by 1972, China wasn’t the USSRs running mate, but essentially the other communist bloc of the world - this was an important factor in Nixon’s motives.
Mao had intentionally made it difficult for the US to approach the PRC as to make his mark as a revolutionary leader. However after his May 1970 anti-American manifesto flopped, and so it dawned on Mao that Maoism was not going to spread much outside China, he changed tack by inviting Nixon to China - possibly to reassert his presence on the international stage. Approaching the Americans wasn’t a new idea however. After the 9th Party Congress in April 1969, Mao had ordered a group of Marshalls to think outside the box of ways to counter the Soviets - playing the American card emerged from this group.
Nixon’s interest in China pre-dated his Presidency with him seeing the Sino-Soviet split as an opportunity to alter the US’s relationship with China in order to further contain the Soviet Union. Policy makers in Beijing also saw the need to alter their relationship with the US for similar reasons, as well as economic. The Chinese, in the lead up to the National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger’s early diplomatic efforts, had been actively encouraging American businessmen to open trade with the PRC, and sought a less isolationist stance - an example being an apparent willingness to join the UN made by the Chinese to the French Delegate in Hanoi.3 4
These were early indications that an opportunity to contact Beijing was presenting itself. Nixon instructed Kissinger to push forward with efforts to contact the Chinese in 1970. Kissinger could not simply contact the Chinese directly as those lines were virtually non-existent, so he decided to pursue third party help from governments who had established those lines with both Washington and Beijing.
Warsaw was a possible option, but ruled out because of Poland being under the gaze of the public - and more importantly, Moscow. Kissinger employed an old friend of his from the Romanian Government, Jean Sainteny, who had contacts with the Chinese Embassy in Paris. Sainteny though was concerned about his approaches to the ambassador in Paris as he didn’t speak Chinese, and he suspected that the interpreter was likely an MSS operative (Ministry of State Security - China’s international intelligence agency).5
Better luck was found through the Pakistani route. At an October Oval Office meeting with Yahya Khan, the ruler of Pakistan, communications with Beijing were discussed since it seemed Khan and Zhou had a kind of diplomatic friendship. Khan mentioned about a previous time he was asked to convey secret communications to Beijing from Washington. Nixon clarified that the purpose of the communication this time was not to establish a red line akin to that with Moscow, but rather to explore the possibility of some high level talks. Kissinger’s conversation with President Ceausescu of Romania shortly afterwards reiterated the same points made between the American and Pakistani presidents. Ceausescu also offered to contact the Chinese.6
The breakthrough came in December, when through the Pakistani route, a response was had from Zhou. Zhou had consulted with Mao, and the Deputy Chairman Lin Biao, about the American advances. Beijing it appeared, was keen on the high level discussions being proposed via President Khan - including ideas on areas of discussion of any potential agenda.
In April 1971 both sides were engaged in important signalling with each other, which led to Kissinger’s secret visit on July 9th. Both Nixon and Kissinger knew that US policy towards Taiwan would play a pivotal role in deciding the success of the trip. Kissinger in his 1979 memoirs would suggest that Taiwan was discussed very little in his discussions with Zhou.7 However, declassified documents show that the reality was quite different. In their meetings Kissinger skirted around the issue by telling Zhou that the US was not seeking a Two China, or a One China - One Taiwan policy, and that they disavow Taiwanese independence. Furthermore, once the Vietnam war had finished, Kissinger said that the US would withdraw two thirds of their forces on the island. These concessions from Kissinger spurred Zhou to suggest that establishing diplomatic ties between the two countries were hopeful.
The Taiwanese, having gotten wind of the talks between Washington and Beijing, under the old Nationalist dictator Chiang Kai-shek had sent a letter directly to Nixon reminding him and his administration of the difficulties in dealing with the Communists as seen during WWII. Chiang reiterated that they hadn’t changed.8
The Chinese side had hidden their desire for the American visit quite well, and so Nixon, and by extension, Kissinger felt that they were the ones approaching the Chinese. This probably lead to unnecessary US concessions including the withdrawal from South Vietnam and Korea, should Nixon achieve re-election, and made guarantees for the PRCs place in the UN. Furthermore, Kissinger offered the Chinese US intelligence on Soviet troop movements along the Soviet-Chinese frontier. Future Vice President Nelson Rockefeller was said to be astonished at the willingness to share this top level intelligence with the Chinese.9
Kissinger revisited Zhou in Beijing in October that year, which coincided with the UNs vote on the place of the PRC. The Council on the 25th voted to replace Taiwan (formally ROC) with the PRC. This included their permanent seat on the Security Council established among the allies immediately after the War.
Kissinger had hoped that the Taiwan issue would fade away, but after Nixon’s resignation in 1974, and President Gerald Ford’s political weakness back home it meant that the issue never got formally resolved. Another contributing factor was that many in the Republican party back in the US where resistant towards switching diplomatic ties from Taipei to Beijing. Kissinger did seek to limit damage to relations with Taipei by maintaining their defence treaty.
During their meetings, Zhou often lectured Kissinger on Americas cruelties and aggressions. Kissinger, probably feeling that he should try and avoid causing unnecessary friction, didn’t refute these, nor highlight the CCPs own cruelties to its people.
However, Kissinger’s secret visit in July 1971 had set the stage for Nixon the following year, with the President announcing his intention to visit on July 15th.
On January 26th 1972, Nixon held an Oval Office meeting with Barend Biesheuvel, Alexander Haig, and J. William Middendorf where he outlined his rationale for the trip. He knew that the scope of the event would be quite narrow, specifically around East Asian security. Nixon wanted to avoid future confrontations with the PRC, either directly as in Korea, or indirectly as in Vietnam, knowing that as China grew in strength and influence, they’ll play a greater part in the geopolitical scene in that region. This was especially paramount considering China had become a nuclear power not long previously.
Nixon was under no illusions that the differences in each other philosophies and interests meant that the two nations where never going to allies like that of Europe - this was despite media at the time drawing out the idea of some great enlightenment of each others way of life. However, he saw that even with these differences, it would be beneficial for everyone to establish diplomatic lines to resolve some of those differences, and more importantly, defuse crisis situations.10
From Kissinger’s secret trip in 1971, it was agreed that the President will spend 4 or 5 days in Beijing, then move onto Hangzhou, then Shanghai, with perhaps another location scheduled in-between. Interestingly, there was work needed to be done by Chinese cadres to condition the Chinese population to the idea of the American President visiting, because for the last couple of decades, the US had been demonised as the enemy. Shortly before the official trip, Kissinger and a small delegation did a rehearsal of the itinerary where they found that the Chinese people - despite the historical propaganda - welcoming. The President himself would receive similar treatment.11
Nixon Arrives
As described at the beginning of this article, it was a grey cold day in Beijing when Nixon arrived, and the welcome party was rather underwhelming. This subdued start continued when the Presidential motorcade made its way into central Beijing, across Tiananmen Square and onto the guest house prepared for the delegation - The Imperial Fishing Villa . The streets were devoid of any crowds or fanfare - the only people around was the usual Beijingers going about their day.
Before the Presidents arrival, places on the itinerary were given a much needed facelift, with the old Cultural Revolution posters - especially the anti-American types - removed and new slogans put in their place; “Great Unity of the Peoples of the World!”12 So too many old crumbling statues which were increasingly becoming liabilities for those walking beneath them. This ‘facelift’ didn’t stop at propaganda pieces, but even the people themselves. Nixon’s visit to Shanghai happen to coincide with the Lunar New Year where usually family members from all parts of the country come together to celebrate. Those coming from rural villages into the city were banished back to their countryside homes, less they happen across the Presidential delegation, and ask awkward questions.
Excitement was though to present itself. The original plan was for Nixon to meet Mao the following day, but barely an hour after arriving at their guest house, Zhou met Kissinger to inform the delegation that Mao will see them immediately. This kind of off the cuff decisions are similar to that of Chinas emperors of old - they’d seem erratic in their desires of when and who to meet to keep foreign visitors off balance and on edge. It is quite fitting then when one can say Mao was the first Red Emperor.
At this first meeting, only three members of Nixon’s group attended, including himself, Kissinger, and Winston Lord as a notetaker. The three were shown past a ping pong table, and into a private study lined with a great number of books, many of which had been seized from peoples homes by Mao’s Red Guards. There they saw the Great Helmsman himself, looking old and frail, flanked by two nurses. He wasn’t dying, but elderly. Unknown to them, behind the book cases there lay a bed where Mao received frequent medical attention - he had collapsed not too long before the visit. Lord distinctly remembers that despite his physical condition, Mao held an immense presence in the room - not for good things, but by account of his reputation.
The meeting lasted about an hour, in which Mao made fleeting sentences, jumping from one topic to the next. It was far from formal, more like a fire side chat. Lord and Kissinger got the impression Mao was a tough man from a peasant background - which indeed he was. This was in great contrast to Zhou who spoke rather more elegantly and in much more prolonged deliberations. It seemed then perhaps that for at least this visit, Mao was the great leader, but it would be Zhou who’d deal with the meat of the issues.
The small group came away from the meeting rather disappointed that very little of substance had been covered. But as they analysed it afterwards, they came to realise the importance of the meeting they just had. The very fact they had seen Mao, showed the trip had his backing, presented to his people as such was a major step to the goals of the whole visit.
Lord was cropped out of the official pictures at the request of Nixon as they felt it would otherwise be a snub to the Secretary of State Rogers who was in the delegation, but absent from this meeting.
Down to Business
In the following days it was time to get down to the real purpose of the visit - the Communique. The Communique was intended to set out an agreement, forming the basis for the normalisation of ties between Washington and Beijing. It covered a multitude of topics including; the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Korea, Taiwan, South Asia, and bilateral relations.
Negotiations over the Communique went down to the wire right up to the last day in Beijing. On the final day, the contents were agreed, and it was ratified by the CCPs Politburo.
Not all the Presidents delegation were in agreement however. The Secretary of State Rogers, and another member by the name of Marshall Green were excluded from the negotiations and only saw the Communique afterwards on the way to Hangzhou. Rogers and Green declared it a disaster, and that the US had given too much away over the issue of Taiwan. Nixon was faced with the humiliating experience of sending Kissinger back to Hangzhou to reopen the negotiations over the Taiwan issue, less should Rogers or Green leak to the US press what had happened.
Premier Zhou gracefully accepted Kissinger’s proposal to renegotiate and this was completed that night, ready for the official press release when the party moved on to Shanghai the following day. What followed was skilful tight rope walking by Zhou and Kissinger. For the latter, he had to balance the US’s international relationships, whilst not alienating the Chinese. This seemingly came at the expense of some the US’s regional allies such as Japan, who was only advised on the contents of the Communique some 15 minutes before the public announcement. This betrayal of trust damaged relations between Washington and Tokyo for quite some years afterwards.
The Communique itself covered the broad range of topics outlined, not only during the visit, but by the lengthy meetings prior. The US outlined its commitment to peace, individual freedom, and mutual respect between nations. They further stated the need for the peoples of Indo-China to determine their own destiny without outside intervention. This lead onto stating the US’s commitment to the eight point plan of US withdrawal from Vietnam. The US statement also included comments about the border issues between India and Pakistan, including around Jammu and Kashmir, and the need for peace - the Chinese also stated much the same in this regard.
The Chinese stated that all nations want independence and liberation, and that the people revolution. It went on to say that larger nations should not bully smaller ones, and strong not bully weak. Interestingly by todays perspective, they outlined that they would not be a superpower, but that they also rejected hegemony - no doubt a swipe at the US.
They also laid out their support for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos for their self determination - noted that these were either fully or becoming Communist. They also pointed to support for the eight point plan for Korean reunification as put forward by the DPRK, and the abolition of the UN’s Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. They too noted against any expansionist militarism from Japan.
Taiwan - probably the greatest issue - was pointed out to be the greatest obstacle to the normalisation of ties between the US and the PRC. The Chinese reaffirmed their stance that Taiwan is a part of China, with the Mainland government being the rightful government for the whole of China. The US agreed to Taiwan being a part of China, however pointed out the need for peaceful reunification. As per Kissinger’s earlier meetings with Zhou, the US committed itself to the gradual withdrawal of troops from Taiwan.
The Communique ended on noting the desire for opening trade links between the two countries.13
You may note that the Chinese got a great deal more out of the Communique than the US, who it seems had quite a narrow objective. As Nixon stated in his pre-visit meetings, the purpose of the trip was to prevent confrontation between the US and China. Normalising ties was also, as a secondary objective, set to push ahead with the US pulling out of Vietnam (and Cambodia by this point) and to further isolate the Soviet Union.
However, even though these objectives were by in large met, it did provide China with the platform to further its own standing in the world, and that of it’s Communist allies in the region - it’s quite apparent that its position on Korea highlighted this especially. And because this was a joint statement with the US, it could be said it gave undue credence to these Communist interests. You can say that the US sacrificed the interests of some of its regional partners for a limited set of objectives.
It must be noted however in regards to the Chinese statements that there is a school of thought that much of what Beijing says publicly is to appease its own people, and doesn’t always necessarily reflect their internal policies.
Aftermath
The members of the delegation were nervous on the return trip home as they were unsure of the reception of the Communique back home. The reception though was one of jubilation, and Nixon was praised for the skilful negotiation of such thorny issues.
The reality was however much more murky. Mao had seen the visit as an opportunity to acquire Western military technology to counter the Soviet threat. He even suggested the idea of some sort of military alliance with the US against the Soviets prior to the American approaches. With these Chinese intentions, it seems ironic that where Nixon wanted to use the visit to reduce the chance of a confrontation with the USSR, it can be argued that through Mao, the risk had actually increased.
Mao had painted a picture to Nixon that a united Communist Vietnam would be a nightmare for Beijing as they suggested that then Hanoi would dominate SE Asia. This was despite that the PRC had been supplying aid to the North Vietnamese for years. This led to Nixon believing that Washington’s and Beijing’s interests in Vietnam were more parallel than they really were. After Kissinger’s secret 1971 visit, and Nixon’s the following year, Zhou went to Hanoi to meet his North Vietnamese comrades. On both occasions the Vietnamese leadership berated Zhou for even talking with the Americans, especially on matters concerning Vietnam.
After the visit, some of the Cultural Revolutions strongest controlled aspects, in particular around industry, did loosen somewhat with further opening to foreign investment and business. Whilst foreigners were allowed into China, less could be said for the reverse, with travel abroad for the Chinese still being heavily restricted.
After the PRC gained its place in the UN, countries flocked to open up diplomatic relations with Beijing. Mao, and Chinese propaganda, had already shown the American approaches as being a white flag after decades of the US policy of isolation against China. The same rhetoric was doled out to these other nations, with Mao one time flippantly referring to them as their international ‘Red Guards’. There was however an unintended consequence. Mao for years had been lavishly giving out aid in order to curry favour and a greater stance on the global stage. For example, Mao permitted loans made to Zaire to be deferred indefinitely, and even said he’d accept repayment in the form of worthless Zairean currency. Prior to Nixon’s visit, 31 countries were the recipients of Mao’s aid, but afterwards this jumped to 66. This aid also included infrastructure projects in a kind of early version of Xi’s BRI. All this was despite having some 900 million Chinese living in abject poverty - Some Chinese remember that the post visit years were some of their hungriest, even when they’d lived through the Great Famine. The reality of this new relative openness was that it only realistically benefited the elite few.
Taiwan certainly got a poor deal out of the visit and the US understood this. As already mentioned, the US maintained its defence treaty with Taiwan. This however made Mao see it as an infringement of their agreement with Nixon, and some of the CCP leadership suggested that Zhou had been taken in by Kissinger.
In a rather peculiar development, in October 1987, John Adams at the Wortham Theater Center in Houston, premiered a play about the 1972 visit, named Nixon in China. This was ground breaking in presenting such a act of theatre about such a contemporary political event.
Today
A great deal has happened since 1972 and today not only the US, but much of the world is entangled with China, especially in trade. Deng initiated his opening up agenda in 1978 onwards which opened up the giant hermit kingdom as it was under Mao, and did away with some of the strongest rhetoric. Under Deng’s ‘bide your time, hide your strength’, the Chinese economy grew dramatically, and that nation grew ever more present in our everyday lives.
No doubt Nixon’s visit probably started the ball rolling for China’s future, and likely made Deng’s agenda far easier to implement. In all likely hood, if the Nixon trip never happened, it then would have occurred under Deng.
In more recent years however, we have seen Xi revert back in part to Maoist style rhetoric, and so the Chinese - US relationship has swung back to confrontation. Who knows what the future holds now, but with a new Cold War looming, many of the issues we see in the news today, were the same issues in 1972, yet they were never addressed. Nixon and Kissinger’s apparent willingness to accept a great deal of concessions for China may have opened the door for China today to begin to act on them. The visit itself wasn’t a mistake, but perhaps they unwillingness to refute some of Chinas strongest advances was.
Note: Chinese names in this article follow the modern Pin Yin methodology of Romanisation, unless where that name in the old method is more recognisable. The names in some of the referenced material follow the older Wade-Giles method.